IDIOTS

[Rolling Thunder]

If I remember the public report correct. I believe this was Lt Col Holland aborting a landing or lowpass over the runway because another jet was taking off.

[budgetdude]

Welcome to 1994, nice well thought out thread you started here.

[3dav8r]

Bottom line is this guy had no business in a B-52 ! I know this case well and he killed some very fine people that day !!

[telepilot]

"I've known a few hotshot pilots myself....they are all dead"! One of the worst foul ups I've ever witnessed as far as military pilots. You know, bank angle limitations are there for a very good reason,
this guy killed another pilot right in front of this three sons and his wife. What a freakin shame!!

[Ion01]

Not to make any excuses for the guy because he knew the bank limitations, but we should keep in mind that military pilots are taught to take their planes to the limits of thier capabilitites because that is what saves lives in war. Their have been numerous other accidents even by the best of the best like the thunderbirds. This one is especially tragic because of the loss of life and, yes, it could and should have been prevented. Just keep in mind that if you keep pushing an airplane it will eventually push back.
Also, aerobatic pilots push the limits to thier extreme. Thier has to be a certain amount of confidence and even a bit of arrogance to continue to risk life and limb in order to push the limits like they do. However, as we can see in great pilots like Matt Chapman, the very best are still very humble and can keep things in perspective. It is their incredible confidence that is kept in control by humbleness that makes them the very best.

[Ion01]

In that video where he banks for the photo shoot it looks like he went past the bank limit but it might just be the angle of the shot. Sometimes you can get away with something numerous times but it will eventually get you.

[Flyinrazrback]

He banked past the limits for the weight and airspeed at that configuration, also aided by the fuel shift causing the plane to continue the dynamic roll that was unstoppable.

[Ion01]

Dude! Check out this pic. If you look really close you can see were the copilot ejected right before impact. He died though.

[why_fly_high]

I feel sorry for the copilot. The dude gets stuck flying with him, bails out and still dies. If he died from landing in the fireball that would be terrible. I would much rather take the sudden thump at the end than burn to death strapped to a seat!

Dan

[Ion01]

	Quote: Originally Posted by why_fly_high
	I feel sorry for the copilot. The dude gets stuck flying with him, bails out and still dies. If he died from landing in the fireball that would be terrible. I would much rather take the sudden thump at the end than burn to death strapped to a seat! Dan

I agree. Such a tragic situation.

[DKjens]

	Quote: Originally Posted by why_fly_high
	I feel sorry for the copilot. The dude gets stuck flying with him, bails out and still dies. If he died from landing in the fireball that would be terrible. I would much rather take the sudden thump at the end than burn to death strapped to a seat! Dan

I think the thump will kill you whether your in the seat or the way he went, the difference is how much can be burried at the funeral.

I don't understand why anybody would even go up with him. That's like saying his former crew is full of ****, when they submittet their reports on this guy.

[JeeUm]

Scan through this, it explains everything in detail.

Darker Shades of Blue:
A Case Study of Failed Leadership
By
Major Tony Kern
United States Air Force




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Author's Preface
When leadership fails and a command climate breaks down, tragic things can happen. This is the story of failed leadership and a command climate which had degenerated into an unhealthy state of apathy and non-compliance--a state which contributed to the tragic crash of a B-52 at Fairchild Air Force Base, on the 24th of June, 1994, killing all aboard.

I have three purposes with this case study. First, I hope to integrate the various elements of the story into a historically accurate and readable case study for all interested parties, to provide a clearer picture of what actually occurred at Fairchild Air Force Base in the years and months leading up to the tragedy. Secondly, I wish to analyze leadership and the command climate at the wing, operations group, and squadron levels. This analysis will identify possible errors and provide lessons learned, for use in academic environments. Finally, I wish to show the positive side of this episode, for there were many who did the right thing, and acted in a timely and proactive manner. Their actions might well have averted the disaster in a more rational command climate. Their story should be told.

All testimony contained in this report are taken from the AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation Board transcripts, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, or through personal interviews conducted by the author. I analyzed transcripts from 49 individual testimonies, and conducted 11 personal interviews. I wish to make it perfectly clear, that no data was taken from the Air Force Safety Mishap Investigation, so the issue of privilege was not a factor in preparing this report. In fact, I intentionally did not read or receive a briefing on the results of the safety board for the express purpose of avoiding even the appearance of a conflict.

Placing blame on individuals was not my intention and is not the purpose of this monograph. However, my interpretation of events found potentially significant errors in leadership, disregard for regulations, and breeches of air discipline at multiple levels. As an officer and aviator, I found many of these events personally and professionally appalling. Occasionally, my interpretation of events reflects this mood. Although I have attempted to avoid bias, I make no apologies for my discoveries. Any errors of omission or commission are strictly those of the author. I write this as my contribution to promoting the Air Force values of integrity, fairness, discipline, and teamwork-- all found to be tragically lacking in this example.


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Format
Because it is envisioned that this case study may be used in academic settings, the format includes certain features that will lend themselves to effective instruction. Key concepts and terms appear in boldface, and are discussed in summary at the end of the monograph. Additionally, hypothetical questions are posed to spur thought and facilitate discussion. The companion "Instructor Guide" is designed for use to a generic Air Force audience and may be modified in any manner to suit effective instruction.

I have documented this case study through the extensive use of informational endnotes and traditional citation endnotes. However, to preclude breaking up the narrative with endless citations (I could have literally footnoted almost every line of the monograph), I have often placed a single citation at the end of a group of testimony or statements which came from the same source, in an effort to improve on the readability of the document. I beg the academic purists' indulgence in this matter.

As a final note, I have copyrighted this case study not to inhibit its use or dispersion among military personnel,--but to prevent portions of the study being quoted out of context to cast negative light on the Air Force or its personnel. This foreword provides blanket approval for military personnel to duplicate this case study in total (cover to cover). I must emphasize again that I do not wish individual segments to be isolated and taken out of context.


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Prologue
"What's the deal with this guy?" Captain Bill Kramer asked, indicating a car conspicuously parked in the center of the red-curbed "No Parking" zone adjacent to the wing headquarters building. It was a short walk from the HQ building, commonly referred to as The White House, to the parking lot where they had left their own vehicles while attending the briefing on the upcoming airshow. As they passed the illegally-parked car and then the various "reserved" spaces for the wing and operations group commanders, Lt Col Winslow turned to Captain Kramer, and replied, "That's Bud's car. He always parks there." After a few more steps the Captain inquired, "How does he get away with that?" The Lieutenant Colonel reflected for a moment and responded, "I don't know--he just does." 1


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Section One: Introduction
There are no bad regiments, only bad colonels.

Napoleon

Failed leadership can have tragic consequences. In the words of Major General (Retired) Perry Smith, a career Air Force aviator and former commandant of the National War College, "Leaders make a difference, and large and complex organizations (like an Air Force Wing) make special demands on the men and women who run them." 2 This is the story of a group of leaders who did not meet all the demands required to establish a healthy command climate, and when confronted with evidence of regulatory deviations- and poor airmanship, did not take appropriate disciplinary actions. There were several manifestations of these failings. Only the most tragic and dramatic is addressed here--the crash of Czar 52. An examination and analysis of the command climate which existed at Fairchild AFB in the three years preceding the crash illustrates several examples of failed leadership relating to a series of breeches of air discipline on the part of a senior wing aviator, Lt Col "Bud" Holland, the pilot in command of Czar 52.

On the 24th of June 1994, Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, WA, launched at approximate 1358 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), to practice maneuvers for an upcoming airshow. The aircrew had the planned and briefed a profile, through the Wing Commander level, that grossly exceeded aircraft and regulatory limitations. Upon preparing to land at the end of the practice airshow profile, the crew was required to execute a "go-around" or missed approach because of another aircraft on the runway. At mid-field, Czar 52 began a tight 360 degree left turn around the control tower at only 250 feet altitude above ground level (AGL). Approximately three quarters of the way through the turn, the aircraft banked past 90 degrees, stalled, clipped a power line with the left wing and crashed. Impact occurred at approximately 1416 hours PDT. There were no survivors out of a crew of four field grade officers. 3

Killed in the crash were Lt Col Arthur "Bud" Holland, the Chief of the 92d Bomb Wing Standardization and Evaluation branch. Lt Col Holland, an instructor pilot, was designated as the aircraft commander and was undoubtedly flying the aircraft at the time of the accident. 4 The copilot was Lt Col Mark McGeehan, also an instructor pilot and the 325th Bomb Squadron (BMS) Commander. There is a great deal of evidence that suggests considerable animosity existed between the two pilots who were at the controls of Czar 52..

This was a result of Lt Col McGeehan's unsuccessful efforts to have Bud Holland "grounded" for what he perceived as numerous and flagrant violations of air discipline while flying with 325th BMS aircrews. Colonel Robert Wolff was the Vice Wing Commander and was added to the flying schedule as a safety observer by Col Brooks, the Wing Commander, on the morning of the mishap. This was to be Col Wolff's "fini flight," an Air Force tradition where an aviator is hosed down following his last flight in an aircraft. Upon landing, Col Wolff was to be met on the flightline by his wife and friends for a champagne toast to a successful flying career. The radar navigator position was filled by Lt Col Ken Huston, the 325th BMS Operations Officer.

While all aircraft accidents that result in loss of life are tragic, those that could have been prevented are especially so. The crash of Czar 52 was primarily the result of actions taken by a singularly outstanding "stick and rudder pilot," but one who, ironically, practiced incredibly poor airmanship. The distinction between these two similar sounding roles will be made clear as we progress in this analysis. Of equal or greater significance, was the fact that supervision and leadership facilitated the accident through failed policies of selective enforcement of regulations, as well as failing to heed the desperate warning signals raised by peers and subordinates over a period of three years prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, there was considerable evidence of Lt Col Holland's poor airmanship spanning a period of over three years.

Significance of the Case Study
The Fairchild example is worth our further analysis and contemplation, not because it was a unique aberration from what occurs in other military organizations, but rather because it is a compilation of tendencies that are seen throughout the spectrum of our operations. Many aviators report that rules and regulations are "bent" on occasion, and some individuals seem to be "Teflon coated" because their mistakes are ignored or overlooked by their supervisors. Most honest flyers will readily admit to operating under different sets of rules depending on the nature of the mission they are about to fly. For example, standard training missions are treated differently than evaluations. Likewise, higher headquarters directed missions are treated differently than inspections, or airshow demonstrations. This often leads to a confusing mental state for young or inexperienced flyers, who see ever-increasing "shades of gray" creeping into their decision-making process. This case study illustrates examples of such missions, and of aviators who felt that the rules were different for them.

Methodology
This monograph takes a case study approach to identify positive and negative aspects of leadership. This study uses no formal definition of leadership, although there are many to choose from. This is not an oversight, but rather by design, to allow each reader the opportunity to apply his or her own notions of leadership to the case study. Leadership assessment will use criterion taken from several sources, chosen for their relevance and practicality, including Major General Perry Smith's "Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders", "The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun", by William Roberts, "Follow Me: The Human Element of Leadership", and "Follow Me II", by Major General (Retired) Aubrey S. Newman, and J. K. Van Fleet's "The 22 Biggest Mistakes Managers Make". In addition, the author selected several points from a lecture given by Lieutenant General (Retired) Calvin Waller on the subject of Ethical Leadership. From these sources, the author compiled a list of questions with which to assess the leadership behaviors. They follow.

Did the leader have all the facts necessary to make an informed decision? For example, did they know and understand the applicable guiding regulations and directives?

Were the leader's actions and words congruent? Did he talk the talk and walk the walk?

Did the leader act in an ethical manner? Would his actions pass the "newspaper test?" 5

Did the leader consider the implications of his actions on subordinates?

Did the leader's actions promote a sound command climate? Did he permit and encourage the free flow of information? Did he require that deviations from standards be reported?

Did the leader enforce established standards? Was the leader able to effectively discipline? Was he fair and decisive?

Senior leadership actions (or lack thereof) will be addressed using a chronological approach and the Leader--Follower--Situation framework outlined by Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy in "Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience", a textbook used at the Untied States Air Force Academy.

Key Concepts: Airmanship, Rogue Aviators,
Leadership, and the Culture of Compliance
At a gut level, most aviators can determine reasonable from unreasonable courses of action, regardless of the nature of the mission. This quality is referred to as judgment or airmanship. From the beginning of an aviator's training, he or she is taught that "flexibility is the key to airpower" and is given considerable latitude in employing methods for accomplishing mission objectives. This is one of the major strengths of airpower and should not be changed. But there are also those aviators, usually of high experience, skill, and confidence, who see this built in flexibility as a chaotic environment which may be manipulated for their own ends--often with tragic results. These rogue aviators are usually popular and respected, possess considerable social skills, and have learned what rules they can break, when, and with whom. They are usually perceived much differently by superiors than by peers or subordinates. This level of sophistication makes the direct oversight role of the supervisor more difficult, and the role of effective command climate more important. What the leader may not recognize as an individual, must be identified for him by the organization. Further, upon this recognition, the leader must act. Failure to act after the organization has fulfilled it's role in identifying a problem, leads to a deterioration of faith in the system by subordinates, who now feel that their input is of little value. A culture of compliance must be inculcated and constantly nurtured to prevent the downward spiral into disaster, such as occurred at Fairchild Air Force Base in June of 1994.

The culture of compliance was certainly not in place at Fairchild AFB in the three years preceding the crash of Czar 52. In this case study, the signs of trouble were present early and often. A pattern of negative activity could be found in complaints from other crewmembers, maintenance problems from over-stressing or exceeding aircraft limitations, and stories of the Lt Col Holland's grand accomplishments and plans that circulated throughout the crew force. After reviewing the history contained in the testimonies, one suspects that an energetic historian could find earlier signs of Lt Col Bud Holland's departure from the aviators' "straight and narrow" path of regulatory compliance, but for our purposes we will limit the analysis to the period between 1991 and June of 1994.

By the summer of 1994, the entire Fairchild culture was caught up in the activities of a single B-52 pilot. Red flags of warning were abundant-- and yet those who could act did not do so, in spite of recommendations to ground Bud Holland. As one B-52 crewmember said about the accident, "You could see it, hear it, feel it, and smell it coming. We were all just trying to be somewhere else when it happened." 6


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Section Two: The Players
There were many individuals involved with this story. This section introduces the reader to Lt Col Holland and the command staff at Fairchild AFB during the period of this analysis. The remainder of the personnel will be discussed as they fit into the narrative.

Lt Col Bud Holland
Lt Col Arthur "Bud" Holland was the Chief of the 92d Bombardment Wing Standardization and Evaluation Section at Fairchild Air Force Base. This position made him responsible for the knowledge and enforcement of academic and in-flight standards for the wing's flying operations. By nearly any measuring stick, Bud Holland was a gifted stick and rudder pilot. With over 5,200 hours of flying time and a perfect 31-0 record on checkrides, Lt Col Holland had flown the B-52G and H Models since the beginning of his flying career in March of 1971.7 He was regarded by many as an outstanding pilot, perhaps the best in the entire B-52 fleet. He was an experienced instructor pilot and had served with the Strategic Air Command's lst Combat Evaluation Group (CEVG), considered by many aviators to be the "top of the pyramid." But between 1991 and June of 1994, a pattern of poor airmanship began to surface. Perhaps his reputation as a gifted pilot influenced the command staff, who allowed this pattern of behavior to continue. The following were typical comments from Lt Col Holland's superiors:

"Bud is as good as a B-52 aviator as I have seen." 8

"Bud was ... very at ease in the airplane ... a situational awareness type of guy. - - among the most knowledgeable guys I've flown with in the B-52."9

"Bud was probably the best B-52 pilot that I know in the wing and probably one of the best, if not the best within the command. He also has a lot of experience in the CEVG which was the Command Stan Eval ... and he was very well aware of the regulations and the capabilities of the airplane (emphasis added)." 10

A far different perspective on Lt Col Holland's flying is seen in statements by more junior crewmembers, who were required to fly with him on a regular basis.

"There was already some talk of maybe trying some other ridiculous maneuvers. - - his lifetime goal was to roll the B-52." 11

"I was thinking that he was going to try something again, ridiculous maybe, at this airshow and possibly kill thousands of people" 12

"I'm not going to fly with him, I think he's dangerous. He's going to kill somebody some day and it's not going to be me." 13

"(Lt) Col Holland made a joke out of it when I said I would not fly with him. He came to me repeatedly after that and said 'Hey, we're going flying Mikie, you want to come with us.' And every time I would just smile and say, 'No. I'm not going to fly with you." 14

"Lt Col Holland broke the regulations or exceeded the limits ... virtually every time he flew." 15

The reasons for these conflicting views may never be entirely known, but hint at a sophisticated approach to breaking the rules that became a pattern in Lt Col Holland's flying activities. Additionally, some light can be shed on the issue by looking at the rapid and frequent turnover of the 92d Bomb Wing senior staff.

The Shifting Command Structure
The 92d Bomb Wing experienced numerous changes to its wing and squadron leadership during the period from 1991 to 1994. The changes included four wing commanders, three vice wing commanders, three deputy commanders for operations/operations group commanders, three assistant deputy commanders for operations, and five squadron commanders at the 325th BMS. Figures 1 and 2 show a leadership timeline at the 92d Bomb Wing from mid 1990 through mid 1994. Above the timeline are listed the eight significant events that will be analyzed. As the discussion proceeds, the interaction between incoming and outgoing members of the staff will be addressed.


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Section Three: The Events
Each of the events leading up to the crash of Czar 52 on 24 June 1994 provides insights on leadership performance. We will analyze each event by providing a synopsis of what occurred, as determined from eyewitness testimony. Secondly, we will look at the action of the followers, which were typically (but not always) B-52 air crewmembers. Finally, we will conclude the analysis of the event with a look at the leader's actions. This framework, or model for analysis is suggested by leading researchers for use in the case study approach. 16 It is important to understand that a historical case study cannot provide definitive guidance for other situations. All situations are unique and must be defined in terms of their own circumstances. It is hoped, however, that this discussion will provide some general lessons that may carry over into other environments.

Situation One: Fairchild AFB Airshow
19 May 1991
Lt Col Holland was the pilot and aircraft commander for the B-52 exhibition in the 1991 Fairchild AFB air show. During this exhibition, Lt Col Holland violated several regulations and tech order (T.O. 1B-52G-1-11, a.k.a. Dash 11) limits of the B-52, by (1) exceeding bank and pitch limits, and (2) flying directly over the airshow crowd in violation of Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 91. In addition, a review of a videotape of the maneuvers leaves one with the distinct impression that the aircraft may have violated FAR altitude restrictions as well.

The Followers
Many of the crewmembers who were at Fairchild for the 1991 airshow were unavailable for interview, but it appears as if there was no large public or private outcry as a result of the 1991 B-52 exhibition. However, some aircrew members had already began to lose faith in the system. One B-52 pilot, when asked why more crewmembers didn't speak up about the violations, said, "The entire wing staff sat by and watched him do it (violate regulations) in the '91 airshow. What was the sense in saying anything? They had already given him a license to steal (emphasis added)." 17

The Leaders
There is no evidence to indicate that commanders at any level took any action as a result of Lt Col Holland's flight activities. There is no indication that either the wing commander (Col Weinman) or the deputy commander for operations (Col Julich) was aware that the profile flown was in violation of existing MAJCOM regulations or FARS. However, there can be little doubt that they were both aware that the profile violated the Dash 11 T. 0. Both men were experienced pilots and were undoubtedly aware of the bank and pitch limitations of the B-52 in the traffic pattern environment, which were grossly exceeded as they personally observed the flyover.

Analysis
The Fairchild leadership failed in two major areas. The first was allowing a command climate in which such a blatant violation of air discipline could be planned, briefed, and carried out without interference. The fact that Lt Col Holland planned and briefed a profile that did not meet established regulatory and Tech Order guidelines suggests a complacent command climate. J. K. Van Fleet, in "The 22 Biggest Mistakes Managers Make," would see this as "a failure to make sure that the job is understood, supervised, and accomplished." 18 One could argue that this level of oversight was unnecessary, since Lt Col Holland, as the Chief of wing Stan-Eval, was a senior officer with a great deal of experience. If this argument is accepted, then the leadership failed to act decisively after the violations occurred. William Roberts, in "Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun" would see this failure to act as a lost teaching opportunity. "Chieftains must teach their Huns what is expected of them. Otherwise, Huns will probably do something unexpected of them." 19 Simply stated, the wing commander and DO did not know certain things they should have known (like command regulations on airshows) and did not enforce standards on violations of regulations that they clearly understood. This would not be the only lost teaching opportunity.

Interestingly, the wing commander had a reputation for demanding strict adherence to air discipline. While acting as the commander of a provisional bomb wing at Andersen AFB, Guam, in GIANT WARRIOR 1990, Colonel Weinman had been very proactive to prevent low altitude violations during airfield attack portions of the exercise. After two days of observing aggressive simulated airfield attacks at Andersen, he remarked, "If we keep trying to outdo each other every day, there is only one way this is going to end--with somebody getting killed. The next guy that busts an altitude will talk to me personally and explain why I shouldn't ground him and send him home." 20 The author could find no explanation for the apparent disconnect between what Col Weinman demanded in the provisional wing and what he allowed to occur at his own airshow.

Situation Two: 325th BMS Change of Command "Fly Over"
12 July 1991
Lt Col Holland was the aircraft commander and pilot for a "fly over" for a 325th BMS Change of Command ceremony. During the "practice" and actual fly over, Lt Col Holland accomplished passes that were estimated to be "as low as 100-200 feet." 21 Additionally, Lt Col Holland flew steep bank turns (greater than 45 degrees) and extremely high pitch angles, in violation of the Dash 11 Tech Order, as well as a "wingover"-- a maneuver where the pilot rolls the aircraft onto its side and allows the nose of the aircraft to fall "through the horizon" to regain airspeed. The Dash 11 recommends against wingover type maneuvers because the sideslip may cause damage to the aircraft.

The Followers
Because most of the 325th BMS personnel were standing at attention in ranks for the Change of Command ceremony, they did not personally see the violations as they occurred. Most had to rely on descriptions from family and friends. The followers were acutely aware, however, that the senior staff had a ringside seat, and therefore may not have felt the need to report or complain about a situation that their leaders had witnessed directly.

The Leaders
This time the leadership was forced to take action. The ADO (Col Capotosti) went to the DO (Col Julich) and remarked "We can't have that, we can't tolerate things like that, we need to take action for two reasons--it's unsafe and we have a perception problem with the young aircrews." 22 Evidence indicates that Lt Col Holland may have been debriefed and possibly verbally reprimanded by either (or both) the DO and wing commander. However, Lt Col Harper, the outgoing Bomb Squadron commander stated, "No overt punishment that I know of, ever occurred from that (the Change of Command flyover)." 23

Analysis
Failures in oversight, an ineffective command climate, and a lack of continuity between words and disciplinary actions earmarked the leadership response to this situation. As in the previous situation, the flyover plan was developed, briefed, and executed without intervention. The flyover for a change of command required approval by the USAF Vice Chief of Staff. 24 No such approval was requested or granted. Although the senior staff was spurred to action by the magnitude of the violations, the response appeared to be little more than a slap on the wrist, a point certainly not missed by other flyers in the wing.

Situation Three: Fairchild Air Show
17 May 1992
Lt Col Holland flew the B-52 exhibition at the Fairchild Air Show. The profile flown included several low altitude steep turns in excess of 45 degrees of bank, and a high speed pass down the runway. At the completion of the high speed pass, Lt Col Holland accomplished a high pitch angle climb, estimated at over 60 degrees nose high. At the top of the climb, the B-52 leveled off using a wingover maneuver. 25

The Followers
Once again, perhaps because the senior staff were eyewitnesses to the violations, the junior crewmembers kept their opinions on the flyby to themselves. A B-52 pilot remarked, "I was amazed that they (the senior staff) let him keep doing that. Getting away with it once you could understand, you know -- forgiveness is easier to get than permission. But this was the third time in less than a year." 26

The Leaders
The wing commander was Col Ruotsala and the Deputy Commander for Operations (DO) was Col Julich. The DO was TDY during the airshow planning sessions from January to April 1992, and was to leave for another assignment within a month after the airshow. 27 The Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations (ADO), Col Capotosti, did not take part in any of the airshow planning due to a family emergency. 28 As a result, the normal command structure was not in place for the planning phase of the airshow. The ADO, Col Capotosti, was to move up to DO a week after the air show. He was upset by the lack of Lt Col Holland's air discipline and told his wife "This will never happen again. In seven days, I'll be the DO. Lt Col Holland will never fly another airshow as long as I am the DO." 29 After he took over as DO, Col Capotosti "took Holland in and told him to his face, behind closed doors, 'If you go out and do a violation and I become aware of it, I will ground you permanently." 30 Although Col Capotosti began to keep a folder on flyover and airshow regulations, there was no documentation of the reprimand or counseling given to Lt Col Holland in any form.

Analysis
A lack of attention to detail, failure to adequately discipline, and a failure to document counseling, were the primary leadership failures at this juncture. Once again, the required waivers were not obtained for the B-52 demonstration. The wing commander stated "I guess I assumed that it had been approved because there are a lot of other flyovers, or flying events ... and it was all kind of bunched up into one approval for the event." 31 This was an incorrect assumption. The outgoing DO took no disciplinary action, perhaps feeling that the new DO would handle the situation. The incoming DO's statement that "this will never happen again" was soon to be qualified with "as long as I'm the DO." Perhaps more significant was the fact that the counseling sessions which apparently occurred after the last incident (Change of Command flyover, 12 July 91), were apparently not passed on to the new DO. If there had been any implied or stated threats to Lt Col Holland after the last event, such as "If you do this again, you are grounded." they were not passed along. This left the new DO at "step one" in the disciplinary process. By this time, the credibility of the senior staff had been severely damaged, and the DO's verbal reprimand most likely sounded hollow to Lt Col Holland, who had been verbally reprimanded by the wing commander for similar violations the previous July. Apparently, the senior staff at the 92d Bomb Wing was unwilling to take preventative disciplinary action, even after three public displays of intentional and blatant deviations from regulations and Technical Orders. Further deterioration of airmanship should not have come as a surprise.

Situation Four: Global Power Mission
14-15 April 1993
Lt Col Holland was the mission commander of a two-ship GLOBAL POWER mission to the bombing range in the Medina de Farallons, a small island chain off the coast of Guam in the Pacific Ocean. While in command of this mission, Lt Col Holland flew a close visual formation with another B-52 in order to take close up pictures. 32 This type of maneuver was prohibited by Air Combat Command (ACC) regulations. 33 Later in the mission, Lt Col Holland permitted a member of his crew to leave the main crew compartment and work his way back to the bomb bay to take a video of live munitions being released from the aircraft. This was also in violation of current regulations. 34

The Followers
The members of the crews on this GLOBAL POWER mission participated in the unauthorized activities that took place. When questioned as to why they did this, several crewmembers testified that Lt Col Holland told them that the wing commander, Brigadier General Richards, had instructed him to do "whatever you need to do, to get good pictures." 35 The pictures and video which resulted were clear and unequivocal evidence that regulations had been broken.

The Leaders
After the mission, the 325th BMS commander, Lt Col Bullock, became aware of the video. One crewmember testified that the squadron commander attempted to coerce him into taking a job as the wing scheduler by using the videotape as "blackmail." 36 The crewmember was so upset with this development that he went to the base Judge Advocate General (JAG) to file a complaint, but was told "he could not win." 37 Lt Col Bullock denies these events took place and states that "no one told him specifically" that illegal events had taken place on the flight. 38 The same crewmember later showed the video to the Deputy Operations Group Commander (ADO), Lt Col Harper, who advised him, "I would not show any of this" relating to certain sequences of the video tape which he (Lt Col Harper) felt were in violation of regulations. 39 When the DO was made aware of the presence of the potentially incriminating video he allegedly responded "Okay, I don't want to know anything about that video -- I don't care." 40 The entire episode began with Lt Col Holland's impression that he was given "some orders (presumably from the wing commander) to basically free-style to get good photographs and video ... to make the presentation (of the wing's accomplishments) more spectacular." 41

Analysis
For the first time, the wing leadership was confronted with "hard copy" evidence of wrong doing on the part of Lt Col Holland. Yet there was apparently no attempt at any level to interview the crewmembers or to reprimand the guilty parties. If the story of blackmail is true, the actions of the squadron commander were dearly unethical and possibly illegal. If they were not true, he still did not enforce existing standards and regulations. The ADO, by his own admission, was aware that illegal activities had taken place during the flight. He claims to have advised the DO of the problem, which the DO denies. In either case, no disciplinary action was taken as a result of this episode. If the DO actually stated "I don't want to know anything about that video--I don't care" he was clearly complacent and failed in his leadership role by not enforcing standards, as well as inhibiting communications. The wing commander may not have been involved at all in this case, as he denies that he ever told Lt Col Holland to "do what it takes to get good pictures." Once again there was no disciplinary action taken or any documentation of counseling.

Perhaps the most disturbing part of this situation is that it shows at least three examples of military officers telling lies, an unpardonable breech of integrity. Either the blackmail incident occurred or it did not, either the ADO informed the DO of the problem or he did not, and either the wing commander told Lt Col Holland to "do what it takes" or he did not. It is unlikely that the individuals involved would have forgotten or misinterpreted these events, making it highly likely that several officers lied while testifying to the investigating authority. Integrity--the cornerstone of officership, was clearly lacking at, or within, all three levels of command.

Situation Five: Fairchild Air Show
8 August 1993
Lt Col Holland flew the B-52 exhibition for the 1993 Fairchild air show. The profile included steep turns of greater than 45 degrees of bank, low altitude passes, and a high pitch maneuver which one crewmember estimate to be 80 degrees nose high--ten degrees shy of completely vertical. Each of these three maneuvers exceeded technical order guidance. As was the case in previous air shows, Air Combat Command approval was required, but was neither requested or granted.

The Followers
By now, the crewmembers of the 325th BMS had grown accustomed to Lt Col Holland's air show routine. But a more insidious effect of his ability to consistently break the rules with apparent impunity, was manifested in younger, less skilled crewmembers. In one example, Captain Nolan Elliot, a B-52 Aircraft Commander who had seen several of Lt Col Holland's performances attempted to copy the "pitch-up" maneuver at an airshow in Camloops, Canada--with near disastrous results. 42 The navigator on this flight said "we got down to seventy knots and ... felt buffeting" during the recovery from the pitch up. 43 At seventy knots, the B-52 is in a aerodynamically stalled condition and is no longer flying. Only good fortune or divine intervention, prevented a catastrophic occurrence in front of the Canadian audience. A second example occurred at Roswell, New Mexico, when a new Aircraft Commander was administratively grounded for accomplishing a maneuver he had seen Bud Holland do at an air show. "It was a flaps down, turning maneuver in excess of 60 degrees of bank, close to the ground." His former instructor said of the event "I was appalled to hear that somebody I otherwise respected would attempt that. The site commander was also appalled, and sat the man down and administered corrective training." 44 The bad example set by Col Holland had begun to be emulated by junior and impressionable officers, and had resulted in one near disaster and an administrative action against a junior officer. This was precisely what Col Capotosti had feared when he warned the DO about Holland's influence on younger crewmembers in July of 1991.

The Leaders
There was no disciplinary action taken at any level of command as a result of the 1993 airshow.

Analysis
The response to this event from the wing commander, Brigadier General Richards, sheds some light on the nature of the overall leadership problem at Fairchild AFB. In testimony after the crash in June of 94, Richards said of Lt Col Holland, "he never acted ... anything other than totally professional ... nothing I saw or knew about when I was at Fairchild led me to any other belief (emphasis added) about Bud Holland." 45 This testimony was from a Wing Commander who personally witnessed Lt Col Holland's flagrant and willful tech order and regulatory violations at his own 1993 air show. Regarding the '93 air show, BG Richards went on to state "I made it absolutely clear that everything that was going to be done in this demonstration was going to have to be on the up and up and in accordance with tech order and in accordance with the regulations ... and I was sure that it was (emphasis added)." 46 It is interesting to note, that the site commander at Roswell, New Mexico immediately recognized a high bank maneuver by a B-52 as a violation of tech order guidance, and took administrative action against the offender. What was going on at Fairchild? Did the Wing Commander not know or understand the tech orders or regulations? Was he misinformed? BG Richards states he looked to the DO, Col Pellerin for guidance. 47 Col Pellerin states he looked to his Chief of Stan-Eval, Lt Col Holland for guidance -- and so the demonstration proceeded under the guidance of an aviator who already had been verbally reprimanded (perhaps twice) for willful violations and poor airmanship. 48 A B-52 pilot interviewed about this state of affairs, said "it was worse than the blind leading the blind. It was more like the spider and the fly" referring to the abilities of Lt Col Holland to bend the leadership to his will. 49 Although there was a new DO in place, Col Pellerin did not take any more forceful action than did any of his predecessors. In fact, there was no verbal reprimand or counseling given to Lt Col Holland, as there had been in the past airshows. He may have seen this as another s